










NONCOOPERATIVE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC NORM 






CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1368 
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE 
DECEMBER 2004 
 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              http://SSRN.com/=646021 
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1368 
 
NONCOOPERATIVE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC NORM 






In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large 
societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can 
emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public 
enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness 
depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which 
individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes 
penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that 
even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative 
equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence 
of effective public norm enforcement. 
JEL Code: H41, K40, Z13. 
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Sociologists point out that people behave in accordance with norms. Economists tend
to emphasize that individuals act according to their interests. This paper provides an
economic explanation of why self-interested individuals voluntarily support the public
enforcement of norms even though this enforcement forces them to comply with a norm
they would violate without public enforcement. The emphasis is on large economies with
arbitrarily many individuals.
Interests in a norm arise when ￿an action has similar externalities for a set of others￿
(Coleman [1990],p .2 5 1), in particular in the case of providing a public good. Therefore,
the relationship between individual interests and norm enforcement is studied in a model
of public good provision. In the standard public good model, in which utility is a function
of private consumption and total supply of the public good, individuals are free-riding on
the contributions of others. As a result, we have underprovision of the public good in a
noncooperative equilibrium. Experimental economics has shown that free-riding behavior
is less pervasive than economic theory suggests. Nonetheless, it is an undisputed fact that
less than an eﬃcient level of a pure public good is supplied when its provision is left to
voluntary contributions (see Ledyard [1995] for a survey). The question to which extent
free-riding behavior destroys public good provision is of particular interest when public
goods concerning large populations are involved. According to the traditional economic
view, the willingness to contribute to a public good shrinks if group size increases and
tends to vanish if population size grows toward in￿nity (Andreoni [1988]). Experimental
research does not support such a size eﬀect for the provision of a pure public good in groups
up to 100 members (Isaac and Walker [1988], Isaac, Walker and Williams [1994]). Also
￿eld evidence on donations to charities challenges the traditional model of noncooperative
public good provision (Andreoni [1988]). There are two main strategies for reconciling
theory with these facts. Either we change individual preferences to include extra motives
of contributing to the public cause, or we account for norm enforcing, assuming standard
individual preferences. The ineﬃciency resulting from free-riding explains why there is a
2demand for a norm that tells individuals how much they should contribute. However, a
norm is only eﬀective if there are means to enforce it by sanctions and rewards. Since
means of enforcement are costly for the agents who provide them, while the bene￿ts of
induced norm compliance accrue to everybody, we have again a free-rider problem. How
can this ￿second-order public good￿ problem be solved in an economic approach based
on decentralized equilibrium outcomes of free individual behavior?
Behavioral economics has provided insights on how cooperation in groups can be sus-
tained by altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding (Fehr and G￿chter [2000, 2002],
Fehr and Fischbacher [2003]). This type of enforcement requires some social relationship
between agents which may not be realistic at the level of a large anonymous society.1 If
social conditions like neighborhood and personal communication are not met, especially
in large associations, eﬀective norm enforcement must be more formal and explicit. Typ-
ically we observe delegation to an institution with oﬃcials and staﬀ employed for looking
that all members contribute their share to public goods.2 I use the term ￿public norm en-
forcement￿ to address this phenomenon.3 We have it not only in associations like states
with police and tax administration, but also in communes, trade unions, professional
associations or churches.
For explaining public norm enforcement as outcome of decentralized decision making
of free and rational individuals we have to answer two questions: How is the norm contri-
1Yamagishi [1986] proposed to distinguish ￿elementary cooperation￿ and ￿instrumental cooperation￿.
Since in large groups it is not possible to guarantee elementary cooperation by mutual control, peo-
ple cooperate at an instrumental level by establishing a sanctioning-system. He supports this idea by
experimental evidence.
2Huck and Kosfeld [2004] consider an interesting ￿hybrid￿ mechanism. There is a central punishment
institution (the state) but the central authority can only act if individuals report deviant behavior in
their neighborhood. Public rules and private engagement in social control interact in this model.
3Carpenter [2004] showed in recent experiments that it is indeed the limited capacity of individuals to
personally monitor others which makes mutual monitoring less eﬀective in larger groups. This suggests
that in large associations public enforcement with professional staﬀ may be the superior institution for
supporting cooperation.
3bution to the public good de￿ned? And, are individuals willing to contribute suﬃciently
to the ￿nancing of a norm-enforcing agency to give the agency the economic means for
implementing the norm eﬀectively? Formally, these questions are analyzed in a two-stage
game, where at Stage 1 agents can contribute to public norm enforcement and at Stage
2 they can contribute to a public good that generates intrinsic value, for example, public
security or environmental quality. I call the public good provided at Stage 2 ￿intrinsic￿
public good if distinction from the public good ￿norm enforcement￿ is necessary. Contri-
butions to a public good are modelled as strategies in a non-cooperative game (Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian [1986], Cornes and Sandler [1986]). At this point it is important to
note the positive character of the presented analysis. The purpose of this paper is not to
present a two-stage game which implements eﬃcient public good provision. The litera-
ture on mechanism design has shown that this is possible in principle and concrete designs
have been proposed (e.g. Varian [1994 a,b]). Here, the goal is to provide an economic
explanation for a typical institutional feature of economies ￿ public norm enforcement.
For isolating the second-order public good problem ￿norm enforcement￿ in a clean
way I adopt the following methodological strategy. First, without public norm enforce-
ment the intrinsic public good is supplied at an ineﬃciently low level due to free-riding. In
particular, per-capita contribution decreases and eventually vanishes if population size in-
creases. This captures the idea that norm enforcement is essential.4 Secondly, an eﬀective
enforcement technology exists. That means, it is possible to induce also in large groups
substantial individual contributions to the intrinsic public good if a suﬃcient amount of
economic resources is invested into the enforcement technology. The amount which would
be invested by a planner who is not constrained by the second-order free-rider problem
de￿nes the benchmark to which the noncooperative equilibrium is to be compared. This
approach is analogous to the comparison of market solution and central coordination in
general equilibrium analysis. Just as a decentralized market economy is not a tabula rasa
4Even in the case of tax-￿nanced public provision of a public good, sanctioning systems are required
to induce compliance with the tax law - due to asymmetric information.
4at which individuals with given endowments and preferences interact without production
possibilities, noncooperative public norm enforcement does not mean that no technolog-
ical means of control or no psychological Know-how to in￿uence individual behavior are
available. The question is rather how much resources are supplied to use the means and
the Know-how. Noncooperative support of public enforcement means that individuals
without coordination or coercion by a central authority invest a suﬃc i e n ta m o u n tt o
produce eﬀective public enforcement.
More speci￿cally, agents are endowed with an economic resource and have preferences
over private consumption and a pure public good (the ￿rst-order or intrinsic public good).
At Stage 1, they individually decide how much of their endowment they contribute to a
public enforcement funds.5 In a second stage, the individuals decide how much they con-
tribute to the (intrinsic) public good. This contribution game at Stage 2 is subject to
public norm enforcement. Sanctions are imposed on agents contributing less than a norm,
and rewards are given to those who contribute more. The larger the enforcement funds
provided at Stage 1 the more powerful are the sanctions and rewards. Finally, the idea of
a decentralized equilibrium requires that also the norm is endogenously generated by indi-
vidual behavior. This is achieved by making the norm a function of average contribution.
We know that punishing and rewarding deviations from average can induce eﬃcient con-
tribution levels if there is no second-order public good problem (see Falkinger [1996] for
a theoretical proof and Falkinger, Fehr, G￿chter and Winter-Ebmer [2000] for behavioral
evidence in laboratory experiments).6 In the framework considered here, this Know-how
is part of the given technology. To make it eﬀective, resources must be invested. There
is no exogenous authority deciding about the degree of eﬀective enforcement. The power
of the sanctions and rewards imposed on the individuals at Stage 2 is endogenously de-
termined by the individuals￿ contributions to the public enforcement funds at Stage 1.I n
the two-stage equilibrium, both the individual contributions to public norm enforcement
and the contributions to the intrinsic public good induced by public norm enforcement
5This corresponds to Yamagishi￿s [1986] experimental design for testing ￿instrumental corporation￿.
6See Chen [forthcoming] for stability and learning properties.
5are determined for a given set of players. Given the fact that the problem of defection
and public norm enforcement is of particular relevance in large anonymous societies, a
central question will be how the equilibrium behaves if the number of players is large, i.e.
goes to in￿nity. We will see that, unlike contributions to the intrinsic public good without
enforcement, the contributions to public enforcement do not vanish.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work on organizations
and institutions. Section 3 outlines the basic model. Section 4 considers the case that pub-
lic enforcement is a pure public good with no rivalry in utilization. The theoretical results
are illustrated by numerical simulations. In Section 5 the case of full rivalry is analyzed,
that is, per-capita contribution determines the degree of enforcement. Section 6 discusses
the interaction between economic support of norm enforcement and psychological factors.
Section 7 summarizes the results.
2 Related Literature
The problem of individual support of public norm enforcement is closely related to the
more general question of how formal organizations and institutions can be explained in
an economic approach based on autonomous self-interested individuals. As Olson [1965]
pointed out, an important characteristic of organizations is ￿the furtherance of interests
of their members￿, that is, the provision of some public good. And ￿just as a state cannot
support itself by voluntary contributions ... neither can other large organizations support
themselves without providing some sanctions ... that will lead individuals to help bear
the burdens of maintaining the organization￿ (p. 15 ) . T h i sl e a v e su sa g a i nw i t ht h e
question why at some stage individuals give to an institution suﬃcient economic means
to provide the second-order public good sanctioning and enforcement of behavior in favor
of the institution.
Following John Locke, the theory of social contracts has argued that ￿rational indi-
viduals, each possessing natural rights, will engage in a joint social contract to give up
6to a central authority those rights which if held and exercised centrally will make them
better oﬀ￿( Coleman [1990], p. 328). Such an approach focusses on the legitimacy of
a central authority, as opposed to anarchy or dictatorial usurpation. The economic ap-
proach presented in this paper does not start with a virtual state of nature. Object of the
analysis is an economy in some given moment in time, characterized by the usual funda-
mentals: Preferences, endowments and production possibilities. Production possibilities
include the technology by means of which endowments can be transformed into the pro-
duction of sanctions and rewards. This technology may be as simple as paid agents going
around, watch people￿s behavior and react to them according to steps written down in a
manual. At more advanced levels of economic development, more sophisticated enforce-
ment technologies are feasible. Automatic surveillance devices, re￿ned statistical methods
for random control, well-targeted instruments of hindering or promoting norm-relevant
activities, psychologically more eﬀective ways of sanctioning, media channels to report
disapproval of unwanted and praise of wanted behavior to a wider audience, or the like.
Just as technical progress raises productivity in the production of private goods, inno-
vations in the feasible means of control and sanctioning change the possibilities of norm
enforcement. Also, just as with private production technologies, feasibility of a public en-
forcement technology does not mean that it is actually used. Generating output requires
employment of input. In the context of norm enforcement: Depending on how much re-
sources the individuals contribute to the funds invested into the enforcement technology,
the realized sanction-reward structure exerts more or less pressure toward norm compli-
ance. Thus, the analysis explains the eﬀective means ￿ the resources ￿ given to public
enforcement. Since by assumption the means are given voluntarily by free and rational
agents, legitimacy is not an issue. The problem is eﬃciency, in particular, whether or not
support of public norm enforcement breaks down if the number of individuals gets large
and no personal relationship controls free-riding.7
7Whereas the normative approach of social contract theory addresses the legitimacy of institutions by
asking which contract individuals would sign, this positive analysis asks how much resources individuals
contribute to ￿rst- and second-level public goods in a noncooperative equilibrium. However, I don￿t claim
7T h ea n a l y s i si sr e l a t e dt oOkada￿s [1993, 1997] noncooperative approach to social or-
ganizations.8 Like in Okada￿s work, social organizations (institutions) have the purpose
of inducing behavior that is favorable for the common bene￿t by giving to a professional
enforcement agency the economic means to sanction free-riding. However, my goal is to
explain the emergence of enforcement institutions without involving collective decision
making (like voting or bargaining) at any stage. Moreover, I am not interested in the for-
mation of small social organizations like clubs but in an explanation of why enforcement
institutions covering large populations ￿nd support without assuming any preexisting
central authority. There is no constitutional rule stipulating how collective decisions are
made and there is no stage at which individuals ￿sign a social contract￿, i.e. decide
whether to enter into the social organization. Instead, there is an enforcement technology
in which individuals can invest. The enforcement produced by the aggregate amount of
individual contributions is applied to everybody regardless of an individual￿s support of
enforcement by own investments. I think this public character is an important feature
of social norms and their enforcement in territorially rooted populations. More gener-
ally, whenever a norm is backed by an enforcement institution with suﬃcient economic
resources, an individual member of a population cannot simply escape.9 Consequently,
the size of the considered social organization is identical to an exogenously given popula-
tion. It should be noticed that feasibility of an enforcement technology does not require a
central authority but equipment and Know-how. Take for instance a global public good
like environmental quality. Inspection and information technologies, but also economic
to provide an explanation of how enforcement institutions evolve over time like evolutionary approaches
to the social contract (Skyrms [1996]) or to social norms (Sethi and Somanathan [1996]).
8See Kosfeld and Riedl [1994] for a discussion of experimental evidence on decentralized individual
punishment in comparison to the formation of a centralized sanctioning institution in Okada￿s theoretical
set up: Individuals can decide about participating in a club (participation stage) whose members vote
or bargain on whether to implement a punishment institution (negotiation stage) which enforces public
good provision among club members (contribution stage). Non members free-ride on the club.
9Not only ￿eeing may be impossible ￿ which in the case of global enforcement de￿nitely is. Also
psychological cost of nonconformity may be high (Bernheim [1994]).
8Know-how about intelligent incentive systems exist. Instead of considering negotiations,
contracts or international constitutions, the approach in this paper is: Suppose an entre-
preneurial agent invites people to spend money into a funds and uses the raised money
for employing existing control technologies and incentive mechanisms to induce behavior
that is bene￿cial for environment quality. The question is to which extent people follow
the invitation and contribute to the funds. Is it possible to enforce a certain behavior in
this way (rather than by negotiation or consensual agreements)? The problem is that the
enforcement funds are invested into the production of a public good. The good ￿ norm
enforcement ￿ may be rival or not, as discussed later. In any case, it is public insofar as
nobody is excluded from its eﬀects. The challenge is to show that eﬀective public norm
enforcement can be supported by a noncooperative equilibrium even if the population is
very large and very strong free-riding incentives work against the provision of goods for
the public bene￿t.
3B a s i c m o d e l
The economy consists of n individuals with preferences over private consumption c and a




(The purpose of this section is to present the argument in the most simple form. The Cobb-
Douglas function allows explicit solutions. Appendix A outlines the model for general
utility functions.)
Each individual is endowed with gross income yi,i=1 ,...,n. Public good G is supplied
at Stage 2 by private contributions, i.e. G = Σn
i=1gi = gi + G−i, where gi is individual i0s
contribution and G−i ≡ Σj6=igi.
At Stage 1 individuals have the possibility to contribute some amount ei ≥ 0 to a
public enforcement funds. This funds is invested into a norm-enforcing technology e f
9employed at Stage 2. An aggregate amount E = Σn
i=1ei = ei + E−i,E −i ≡ Σj6=iej, of
public enforcement resources produces a sanctioning strength e f (E,n) which allows to
eﬀectively impose the punishment-reward scheme





on the individuals￿ contribution behavior at Stage 2.10 (ri is measured in units of endow-
ments.)
The norm to which an individual￿s contribution gi is compared is the average amount
g−i ≡
G−i
n−1 of the contributions of all others. Thus, the norm is endogenously formed by the
population. There is no social planner de￿ning the norm. Norm compliance induced by
internalized controls would mean that deviations from the norm are penalized or rewarded
by an exogenous rate β0 requiring no economic resources.11 Delegation of enforcement
to an agency means that the eﬀective penalty-reward strength is produced by employing
resources E into a technology e f. This technology consists of two components
e f (E,n)=βf (E,n) (3)
where f (0,n)=0 ,f(E,n) ≤ f,fE > 0 and fEE < 0 is assumed. (Subscript notation is
used for partial derivatives.) β is the nominal strength of the means allowed to induce
norm compliance. Incentive researchers may recommend a certain size of β and write it
into the instructions for e f. This requires neither authority nor resources ￿ only expertise.
However, without employing resources, β is just a number, a parameter that can be set.
(In Section 4 the parameter is ￿xed to β =1 . In Section 5 the role of adjustments of
β is considered.) The eﬀective sanctioning strength is βf. It depends on the degree of
enforcement, that is, on the economic resources applied to produce an eﬀective degree of
enforcement f. More resources allow a higher degree (fE > 0). For instance, larger funds
10Second-order punishing (rewarding) would mean that e f is employed also at Stage 1. In principle, one
may have many stages with third-order enforcement and so on. In the end, the important distinction is
between situations with enforcement and without.
11The role of psychological controls will be discussed in Section 6.
10allow more freqent inspection and more eﬀective monitoring of contribution behavior at
Stage 2. If individuals decide to contribute zero to E,e ﬀective sanctioning strength e f
is zero whatever is the size of the nominal strength (β).12 The marginal productivity of
increasing enforcement resources diminishes (fEE < 0) and the degree of enforcement is




. Population size n should not matter if public
enforcement is a pure public good characterized by non-rivalry. This is assumed in the
enforcement technology considered in the next section. Section 5 considers a technology
with full rivalry, which means enforcement is a public good only in the sense of non-
excludability. Apart from E, there are no public cost of imposing scheme (3), since
Pn
i=1 ri =0 .13 The next subsection characterizes Stage 2 for a given size of enforcement
funds E.14
3.1 Stage 2 equilibrium
At Stage 2, the budget constraint of an individual i is given by the equation
ci = yi − ei − gi + ri (4)
= yi − ei − (1 − βf)gi − βfg−i
where ei was spent at Stage 1 and ri results from penalty-reward scheme (2) imposed by
enforcement technology (3). For notational simplicity the arguments of f are suppressed.
Maximizing (1) subject to (4), individual i chooses gi so that
MRS =1− βf, (5)
where MRS ≡ 1−α
α
ci
G is the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption ci
and public good G. The right-hand side of equation (5) is i￿s eﬀective marginal cost (the
12f (0,n) > 0 would mean that an exogenous (￿psychological￿) penalty-reward mechanism is eﬀective
without investing any economic resources.
13Use
Pn
i=1 G−i =( n − 1)
Pn





14Stage 2 game is a special instant of Falkinger [1996] where general utility functions are considered
a n du n i q u e n e s sa sw e l la se ﬃciency of equilibria are discussed.
11￿price￿ in terms of private consumption) of contributing to the public good. A higher
degree of enforcement reduces this cost, since an increase of gi reduces punishment (as
long as gi < g−i) or increases rewards (if gi > g−i). At the same time, a lump-sum tax
βfg−i is imposed on i￿s budget (4).15
In a meaningful economic model the eﬀective price of contributing to the public good,
1 − βf,m u s tb ep o s i t i v e . T h u s ,w ei m p o s et h er e s t r i c t i o nβf<1 on the enforcement
technology.16
Summing (4) over all i, we obtain the following restriction on aggregates:






Thus, condition (5) can be rewritten in the form
ci =( Y − E − C)ρ, ρ(E,n) ≡
α
1 − α
(1 − βf (E,n)). (7)
(Again the arguments of ρ are suppressed to save notation.)




(Y − E) (8)
15Eﬀective enforcement strength βf works like government subsidies for private donations to public
goods. Roberts [1987, 1992], Boadway, Pestieau, and Wildasin [1989], among others, have analyzed such
subsidies under the assumption that individuals do not anticipate the taxes by which the subsidies are
￿nanced. In contrast, reward structure (2) is self-￿nancing (
P
ri =0 )and individuals account for the im-
plied tax burden βfg−i. See Andreoni and Bergstrom [1996] for another model in which subjects account
for the government￿s budget constraint. Brunner and Falkinger [1999] provide a general characterization
of the eﬀects of taxes and subsidies in an economy with private provision of public goods.
16This can also be interpreted as follows: An increase in the eﬀective sanctioning strength is not
necessarily bene￿cial, since it may induce overcontribution to the public good. With very steep sanctions,
individuals would give all their endowment for G.





Without eﬀective sanctioning, i.e. if E =0and βf =0 , we have ρ = α
1−α and per-
capita contribution to public good G is g0 (n)=
y
1+ αn
1−α in a noncooperative equilibrium.
g0 (n) vanishes if n is getting large. Thus, the model re￿ects the familiar conjecture that
free-riding destroys voluntary public good supply in large populations when individuals
have standard preferences and no institution enforces norm compliance. The question is
whether the problem is overcome if individuals can invest in public enforcement funds.
Finally, after substitution of (8) for C in equation (7) and substitution of (7) and (9)
for ci,Gin utility function (1), the pay-oﬀ that can be achieved by an agent at Stage 2 is




(Y − E). (10)
(Note that ρ = α
1−α [1 − βf (E,n)] depends on the contributions to enforcement funds E.)
Since ci > 0 and G>0, according to ￿rst-order condition (5), E<Y and thus V> 0.
3.2 Stage 1 equilibrium
At Stage 1, individual i￿s decision problem is
max
ei
V (ei + E−i). (11)















where ρE = −βfE.
17A c c o r d i n gt o( 10), V 0 =
αρα−1(1+ρn)−ραn
(1+ρn)2 ρE (Y − E) −
ρα




1+ρn ρE − 1
Y −E which gives (12). Note that ci > 0,G>0 imply E<Y and thus V> 0.













Provided that the second-order condition holds18,e q u a t i o n( 13) uniquely characterizes
the equilibrium size of the public enforcement funds E∗. Since ei and E−i substitute each
other one to one, the Nash equilibrium supporting E∗ is not unique. Note however that
with E∗ also C and ci are unique according to (7) and (8). Thus, only the distribution of
an individual￿s contributions to the public cause, on G or E, is undetermined.
Note also that without sanctioning, i.e. if β =0 , we have ρE =0and thus E∗ =0 ,
since F<0 in this case. Obviously, contributing to a public enforcement funds would be
useless if it is not used to exert pressure for norm compliance at Stage 2. Finally, at an
equilibrium E∗ > 0 de￿ned by condition (13), utility V (E∗) achieved in the equilibrium
is higher than utility without enforcement V (0).19 Thus, although norm enforcement has
costs (the higher E, the lower is the income Y − E remaining for public good G and
private consumption C), incurring these costs up to equilibrium amount E∗ is welfare
improving.
The next section characterizes the equilibrium for the case that public enforcement is
a pure public good.
4 Noncooperative equilibrium with non-rival public
enforcement
In general, the degree of enforcement f depends on both the volume of available en-
forcement resources E and the number of individuals n whose norm compliance has to
18The second-order condition V 00 = V 0F + VF0 < 0 is satis￿ed at V 0 =0if F0 < 0. As u ﬃcient
condition for this inequality is given in Appendix B. The condition holds for all enforcement systems
considered in the further analysis.
19V 0 (E∗)=0and V 00 (E) < 0 at any E with V 0 (E)=0imply that E∗ is a global maximum of V with
V 0 (E) > 0 for E<E ∗.
14be controlled. If public enforcement is a pure public good without any rivalry in use,
population size n plays no role. For instance, enforcement may require to set up some
monitoring device which is subject to economies of scale. The efectiveness of the device
varies, depending on how much resources are spent on it, but given the total amount of
spent resources, the number of monitored individuals is unimportant. Let the degree of





With (14 )t h ed e g r e eo fe n f o r c e m e n ti ss t r i c t l yc o n c a v ei nE, increasing from zero for
E =0to one as E grows to in￿nity. Thus, f satis￿es the properties required in Section
3.
Normalizing the maximal strength of sanctions (imposed under perfect enforcement
when enforcement degree f is equal to 1)t oβ =1 , we get for the eﬀective price of








With this speci￿cation ￿rst-order condition (13) reduces to the following quadratic
equation in per-capita contribution e ≡ E/N to the public enforcement funds:21
D(n) − k(n)e =( 1− α)e
2 (16)
20As can be seen from the proofs in the appendix, the results go through if f (E,n)=1− B
1+E,0 <
B ≤ 1, is considered instead of (14). B<1 means that even without enforcement resources the degree
of enforcing sanctions and rewards is positive, namely f (0,n)=1− B. Thus, non-economic factors are
dampening free-riding. The only important eﬀect of B<1 is that the group size for which substantial
contributions to the public good can be expected without public enforcement increases. In Section 5, a
more ￿exible functional form with three parameters γ,Aand B is used, where γ represents the degree of
rivalry (equal to zero in this section) and A, B are eﬃciency parameters. The role of A, B is discussed
in Section 6.
21Set γ =0and B =1in Appendix C. For the proof that the second-order condition for a maximum
holds at e determined by (16) see Appendix B.







n2 and k (n) ≡ 2−α
1−αα+αy+ 2−α
n , where y ≡ Y/ndenotes
per-capita income.
D(n) is an increasing function of n, reaching D(n0)=0at n0 > 1 and approaching
D ≡ αy as n goes to in￿nity, whereas k(n) decreases with n eventually going to k ≡
2−α
1−αα + αy>0. Thus, for n>n 0 equation (16) de￿nes a unique contribution level
e∗ (n) ∈ (0,D(n)/k(n)) where D(n)/k(n) increases with n towards e ≡ D/k.22 For
22Note that D/k<min{1,y}.
16
Figure 1: Equilibrium contribution to non-rival public enforcement
D
/ D k ()
* en e e
()
2 1 e α −
Dn ≤ n0, we have e∗ (n)=0 . Figure 1 illustrates this solution of (16). (The negatively
sloped line representing the left side of (16) approaches the dashed line as n increases to
in￿nity.)
e∗ (n) is the per-capita contribution to the public enforcement funds resulting in Stage 1
equilibrium. Since D(n) increases whereas k (n) decreases, e∗ (n) is an increasing function
of n. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 . Public norm enforcement in large societies can indeed result as non-
cooperative outcome of voluntary contributions of sel￿sh individuals. Above some min-
imum group size, n>n 0, equilibrium per-capita contribution to the public enforcement
funds invested in technology (14) is given by an increasing function e∗ (n) ∈ (0,y) of
population size n.
This shows that free-riding in supplying the second-order public good ￿enforcement￿
is less a problem in large societies than it may be in small groups.23 Provided that innova-
tions have brought about the technical possibility of public norm enforcement, economic
resources for employing this possibility are voluntarily contributed even by purely sel￿sh
individuals. The reason is, individuals anticipate that by contributing to the public en-
forcement funds they can exert pressure on the others to contribute to the intrinsic public
good in the second stage. Thus, besides the positive external eﬀect of an individual￿s
contribution to the public good E at Stage 1, the contribution at Stage 1 has a negative
external eﬀe c to no t h e r sa tS t a g e2 .I ns m a l lg r o u p s(n ≤ n0) this does not give suﬃcient
motives for sel￿sh individuals to contribute to public sanctioning and rewarding. So some
kind of alternative motives like altruistic punishment is required to explain why punishing
and rewarding of deviators occurs also in small groups. In large anonymous societies such
reliance on altruistic behavior seems less convincing. Nor is it necessary as the presented
analysis shows.
23Threshold n0 which must be passed to yield e∗ (n) > 0 is de￿ned by D(n0)=0 .S i n c eD(n) increases
in both n and y, the threshold is lowered if y rises.
17In the presented framework, enforcement as such does not generate utility.24 It has
only indirect value through the provision of G. Ultimately, the relevant question is which
level of public good G is provided under e∗. Again we focus on the per-capita level g ≡ G
n.
Substituting (15) for ρ in equation (9) and dividing by n, we get
g
∗ (n)=






Since e∗ < e<y ,we have g∗ > 0. Population size n has a direct negative eﬀect on
g∗. This is the usual eﬀect that free-riding increases if group size increases. However, as
we have seen an increase in n increases e∗. Thus, there is also an indirect eﬀect of n on
g∗ through stronger norm enforcement. And this eﬀect is positive.25 The numerical sim-
ulations presented below illustrate the net impact of the negative direct and the positive
indirect eﬀect of population size on g∗. But the central conclusion can be drawn generally:
Even in very large societies, the private provision of public good G does not break down.




e∞ > 0,w h e r e
e∞ ≡ lim
n→∞
e∗ (n) and 0 <e ∞ <yaccording to Proposition 1. Without enforcement26, i.e.
with e =0 ,w ew o u l dh a v eg =
y
1+ α
1+αn which vanishes if n goes to in￿nity. Only the fact
that subjects contribute to public norm enforcement at Stage 1 guarantees that private
contributions to the public good at Stage 2 do not vanish despite sel￿shness and in￿nitely
large population size. This establishes our second result.
24de Quervain, Fischbacher et al. [2004] have shown for anonymous pairwise interactions that punishing
activates reward-related brain areas, which suggests that people do derive satisfaction from sanctioning.
Her such satisfaction is excluded. Individuals cannot impose direct sanctions on others. They can only
contribute to the ￿nancing of an enforcement agency whose eﬀectiveness depends, apart from technological
conditions, from aggregate supply E.
25According to (17),
∂g∗
∂e∗ > 0 if (y − e) α
1−α
1
(1/n+e)2 > 1+ α
1−α
1

















e>(1 − α)e2. Since αy− α
n − 1−α
n2 >D(n) and 2α+
2(1−α)
n <k(n), this inequality holds
at e∗ in view of condition (16).
26In the presented model, e∗ =0if no sanctioning is admitted i.e. if β =0 .
18Proposition 2 . Voluntary contributions to public norm enforcement can support private
provision of public goods even in large sel￿sh societies in which no public good would be
provided without enforcement. Under technology (14), lim
n→∞
e∗ (n) > 0 and lim
n→∞
g∗ (n) > 0
in a noncooperative equilibrium.
Table 1 shows numerical results for y = 100 and α =0 .75, varying population sizes up
to n =1 0 9. Without an enforcement problem the fully informed and benevolent planner
would choose the public good share in aggregate income G/Y equal to 1−α =0 .25. For a
level of per-capita income y = 100, this implies that in a ￿rst best world per-capita contri-
bution to the intrinsic public good would be equal to g =2 5 . According to (14), without
enforcement, i.e. if E =0 , the degree of sanctioning or rewarding norm compliance is zero
so that free-riding incentives are fully operating. The resulting noncooperative outcome
is listed in the left half of Table 1. It shows that contributions to the public good vanish
if n gets large. In contrast, the right half shows the noncooperative outcome resulting







No enforcement () 0 E =   Enforcement technology available 
n 
0 g   0 V  
* e   * g   * V  
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−   75.79 0.95 23.81  10035.21 
 
 
Table 1:   Noncooperative equilibrium when enforcement technology is not available 





 Adding e∗ to g∗ in Table 1, we come quite close to a public expenditure share of 25
percent in the noncooperative equilibrium. Part of this public expenditure is absorbed for
the ￿nancing of public enforcement measures. Due to economies of scales in enforcement
technology (14), this part shrinks as n gets large. The results show very clearly that
the noncooperative support of public good provision through public norm enforcement
doesn￿t break down, and in fact may be quite eﬃcient, even if economies are as large as
the largest countries of the world. If no enforcement technology is available, free-riding
is pervasive, in particular when population size is large. Comparison of utility level V 0
reached in the noncooperative equilibrium without enforcement to V ∗ under enforcement
shows the utility gains of public norm enforcement.
Given a society￿s gains from public norm enforcement it is worth to ask once more
which kind of prerequisites are exactly needed? According to the above analysis, the
only requirement is access to an enforcement technology and an entrepreneurial agent
operating the technology. No central authority is needed to induce people to adopt the
technology. Rational individuals voluntarily invest into the technology. Note also that
no central authority has to know individual preferences for stipulating the norm that is
enforced. According to (2), this norm emerges endogenously from individual contribution
behavior. The reason for the noncooperative support of norm enforcement is its public
character. Non-excludability of public good E means that nobody can escape the en-
forcement measures ￿nanced by E. So my contribution ei exerts compliance pressure on
me but on all others as well. Obviously, the assumption of non-rivalry of E makes the
enforcement particularly eﬀective if n is large. This is why the utility gains shown in
Table 1 (V ∗ compared to utility levels V 0 achieved without enforcement possibility) are
huge. In the next section the assumption of non-rivalry is dropped and E will be a public
good only insofar as nobody is excluded from its eﬀects.
205 Noncooperative equilibrium when public enforce-
ment resources are subject to full rivalry
Suppose that instead of the absolute size of public enforcement funds the per-capita
expenditure on public enforcement matters for the eﬀectiveness of sanctioning free-riding.





rather than by (14).
Then, the ￿rst-order condition characterizing individual contributions to the public
enforcement funds is again a quadratic equation like (16), however with diﬀerent parame-
ters. We have:27
e D(n) − e k(n)e =( 1− α)e
2 (19)
where e D(n) ≡ [(1 − α)y − 1] α






that (1 − α)y>1, we have ∂ e D/∂n>0 so that e D(n) > 0 for n above some minimal group
size e n0 at which e D(e n0)=0 . Moreover, e k(n) > 0 and for (1 − α)y>1, the ratio e D/e k is an
increasing function of n approaching e e ≡
(1−α)y−1
2−α .28 In sum, for y> 1
1−α and n>e n0, the
solution of (19) is an increasing function e∗ (n) with 0 <e ∗ (n) and lim
n→∞
e∗ (n)=e e<y .(For
n ≤ e n0, we have e∗ (n)=0 .)29 Figure 2 illustrates this. Like in Figure 1 the negatively
sloped line represents the left side of (19). As n increases the line is shifted outward
(dashed line), approaching - in contrast to Figure 1 - eventually the vertical line through
e e.
27See Appendix C which considers enforcement technologies f (E,n)=1− B
1+En−γ,0 <B≤ 1,o f

















[(1 − α)y − 1] α
1−αn − αy − 1
o






+1+αy>0 which certainly holds for
(1 − α)y>1.
29Again the threshold e n is lowered if y rises, since e D(n) increases with y.
21Hence, economies of scale in the enforcement technology are not essential for the
result that individuals make voluntary contributions to public enforcement also in large
economies. Full rivalry doesn￿t destroy the incentives to invest into public enforcement.
To the contrary, individuals may be inclined to give more for the enforcement funds.30
However, turning to Stage 2, we have now ρ = α
1−α (1 − βf)= α
1−α
¡









2−α+y(1−α) which is equivalent to (1 − α)
2 y2−y(1 − α) > 2−α. This inequality
holds for y suﬃciently high.
22
Figure 2: Equilibrium contribution to fully rival public enforcement.
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a c c o r d i n gt o( 9 ) .
Since lim
n→∞ e∗ (n)=e e<∞, lim
n→∞ g∗ (n)=0 . Thus, despite enforcement, contributions
to the public good at Stage 2 eventually vanish. Table 2 shows that g∗ (n) can decline
quite quickly. The reason is that with rivalry the enforcement technology is less eﬃcient
in the sense that the same volume of E produces a lower degree of enforcement as n
rises.31 Therefore, the provided enforcement resources do not produce enough sanctioning
strength at Stage 2 to overcome the strong free-riding incentives in the G-supply if n
is large. The following proposition summarizes this result. It should be noticed that
parameter β of nominal strength was held constant (by normalization to one). We will
see later that this is a crucial restriction.
Proposition 3 . For a given nominal sanctioning strength (β =1 ) , if the enforcement
technology is subject to rivalry: (i) Individuals keep contributing to public enforcement
in large societies, provided that per-capita income is not too low ((1 − α)y>1). (ii)
Individual contributions to the intrinsic public good eventually break down nonetheless.
The result does not say that the resources invested into public enforcement are useless.
Otherwise rational people would not contribute in the ￿rst place. Table 2 shows e∗, g∗
and V ∗ resulting under technology (18) in contrast to g0 resulting when E =0 . We see
that g∗ is substantially higher than g0 in Table 1.A l s oV ∗ is higher than V 0.
31As Isaac and Walker [1988] separated out very clearly in their experiments, under rivalry an increase
of group size has also the eﬀect that the marginal impact of an individual￿s contribution diminishes, in
addition to the size eﬀect observed in the case of a non-rival public enforcement resource E.I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,
this does not erode contributions to the second-order public good, in contrast to Isaac and Walker￿s
￿ndings for the case that a rival intrinsic public good is provided.
23Proposition 3 shows that the problem of free-riding at Stage 2 is not due to second-
order free-riding at Stage 1. It occurs despite the fact that individuals provide public
enforcement funds. The problem is that ￿rst-order (i.e. Stage 2) free-rider incentives in
large societies are too strong to be overcome by the considered sanctioning device. A
dictator who had the power to extract as much enforcement resource from the people as
he wants would have the same problem. For any level of enforcement resource per-capita,
for large n, g∗ (n) would vanish in the Stage 2-public good game, as can be seen by sub-
stituting any e,0 <e<y ,for e∗ (n) in (20). This suggests that something is missing
in the speci￿cation of the sanctioning system. To get an idea what, we have to call in
mind what is a reasonable benchmark to which the noncooperative equilibrium should
be compared. As discussed in the introduction, this benchmark is a central authority
which is not constrained by the second-order free-rider problem but at Stage 2 also has
to rely on norm enforcement by punishing and rewarding according to (2). Suppose that
this central authority is a dictator as mighty as we can imagine. That means, he can
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10      5.59  17     94.23 
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Table 2   Noncooperative equilibrium when enforcement technology is available 
but fully rival.  100, 25 FirstBest yg == . 
 
 
 any level of enforcement resource 0 <e<y . Under technology (18), the degree of eﬀec-
tive enforcement is bounded by f<1 − 1
1+y.T h u s , h o w e ﬀectively nominal incentives
for norm compliance can be implemented depends on per-capita income y.F o r m a k i n g
things better compatible, it seems reasonable to restrict the analysis to situations in which
a dictator could achieve perfect enforcement, that means, reach a degree of enforcement f
equal to 1 at some feasible e<y , regardless of size n of the population. This is guarantied
if function f satis￿es the following assumption.
Assumption 1.T h e r ee x i s t se<yso that for any n,i fe ≥ e then f (en,n)=1 .
Since the dictator has the power to extract any e<yhe can always realize the maximal
degree of enforcement. Moreover, he can choose nominal sanctioning strength β at his
discretion. The following lemma shows that, by using this power, a dictator is able to
implement any level g<y− e.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, for any n and g<y− e, if e = e,t h e ng∗ (n)=g in
the noncooperative equilibrium at Stage 2 for β =1− κ/n with κ =
(1−α)(y−e−g)
αg .
Proof. By assumption, f (e,n)=1 . Thus, 1−βf = κ/n and ρ = α
1−α
κ
n. Using this in







This shows: In groups of any size, it is possible to induce a desired level of contributions
by a sanctioning system penalizing and rewarding deviations from the norm established
by average contributions. However, to overcome the rising free-riding incentives in large
societies, the allowed strength of sanctioning β must be increasing with n. The diﬀerence
between the above thought experiment about a dictator and the noncooperative support
of public enforcement lies in Stage 1. A dictatorial central authority has the power
to command enforcement means e by assumption. In a noncooperative explanation of
public norm enforcement, the provision of e must be the equilibrium outcome at Stage 1.
Whether or not this is possible is the subject of the further analysis.
25What we have learnt from the thought experiment is that eﬀective norm enforcement
in large societies requires two innovations if enforcement is subject to rivalry: First, there
must be access to enforcement technologies which reach maximal enforcement at a feasible
size of enforcement funds e<y(Assumption 1). Second, higher nominal sanctioning
strength β must be allowed as the economy gets larger. Again, in the noncooperative
equilibrium, no central power is involved at Stage 1. Like before, we have the following
situation: There is a device consisting of technology f with max f =1together with a
parameter β de￿ning the nominal sanctioning strength. An entrepreneurial agent oﬀers
to operate this technology at the level ￿nanced by voluntary contributions. An incentive
expert has recommended to adjust parameter β to population size according to the formula
β =1−κ/n,w h e r eκ is a constant. At Stage 1, individuals decide noncooperatively how
much they invest into this technology. At Stage 2, individuals contribute to the intrinsic
public good under the public enforcement resulting from investments in the enforcement
technology at Stage 1. I will show that Assumption 1 together with the adjustment of β
to group size is suﬃcient for explaining both public norm enforcement and the provision
of the public good as outcome of a noncooperative equilibrium, also if the economy is very
large.
Under technology (18), the upper bound is perfect enforcement. But it is never reached
even if arbitrarily large enforcement resources are employed per individual. For making











where e = B
A−1 − 1 is the input required for perfect enforcement (f (en,n)=1 )a n dA,
B are parameters satisfying 0 <B≤ A (so that f ≥ 0 and fE > 0 for E ≥ 0)a n d
1 <A<B+1(guaranteeing e>0). Parameter A and B allow for variations in the
eﬀectiveness of the available control technology. A rich variety of possible shapes of f is
covered by (21). Some reasons and interpretations for changes in A or B and their eﬀects
on the noncooperative equilibrium are discussed in Section 6.
26Under (21), Assumption 1 is guaranteed if y> B
A−1 − 1(=e). Hence, according to
Lemma 1,a n yg<y− e can be implemented at Stage 2, if e is provided at Stage 1.T h e
following lemma shows that this is indeed the case if β is adjusted to group size.
Lemma 2 .L e tf be given by (21) with B





with 1−α < κ ≤ 1.
There exists n so that for any n ≥ n per-capita contributions to public enforcement in a
noncooperative equilibrium are equal to e.
Proof. Appendix D.
Since e∗ (n)=e, we have βf =1− κ
n and ρ = α
1−α (1 − βf)= α
1−α
κ
n. Using this in (9),







Since 1 − α < κ ≤ 1, we have
y−e
1+α >g ∗ (n) ≥ (1 − α)(y − e).
Substituting c = y − e − g∗ (n) and G = ng∗ (n) in (1), we obtain the utility level




α (1 − α)
1−α
1 − α + ακ
(y − e). (23)
Thus, maximal welfare is achieved in a noncooperative equilibrium if parameter κ =1
in the design of the sanctioning system. In this case, we have g∗ (n)=( 1− α)(y − e).
κ < 1 means higher β. This would not change e∗ (n), t h ed e g r e eo fe n f o r c e m e n ti sa l -
ready maximal at e∗ (n)=e. But higher contributions to the intrinsic public good are
induced at the cost of private consumption. This indicates that levying heavier penalties
and rewards is not always a good idea. Since people provide the resources to eﬀectively
impose them, they may lead to overshooting contributions to the public cause. For κ =1 ,
we have e∗ (n)+g∗ (n)=( 1− α)y. Thus, exactly the same share of public expenditure
in income is provided in the noncooperative equilibrium as a benevolent planner would
choose. However, in a ￿rst-best world all expenditures could be used for ￿nancing the
27intrinsic public good, whereas here part e is absorbed by enforcement activities. The
following proposition summarizes these results.






,1 − α < κ ≤ 1, is available, then for any size n (except possibly
small groups): (i) Individuals contribute e∗ (n)=e to public enforcement so that sanction-
ing strength β is enforced at maximal degree. (ii) Individual contributions to the intrinsic
public good are positive and may even be too high from a welfare point of view. (iii) Wel-
fare is maximal if κ =1 , i.e. nominal sanctioning strength should not be unnecessarily
high.
This establishes that size advantages of non-rival enforcement are not essential32 for
￿solving￿ the free-rider problem in large economies through noncooperative contributions
to public norm enforcement. The important thing is the eﬀectiveness of the feasible en-
forcement technology in relation to per-capita income. Either y must be high enough
to guarantee e<yfor the given state of art of control technology f,o r ,f o rag i v e n
level of y, technical progress allows perfect enforcement at a suﬃciently low level of re-
source input. This suggests that noncooperative support of public norm enforcement in
large populations requires a certain state of development and that technical progress,
for instance, inspection and information technologies that decrease the cost of observing
deviating behavior, may lead to such support where it has not been present before.
6 Discussion
The goal of this analysis was to show that public norm enforcement and public good
provision in large societies can result as equilibrium outcome of noncooperative interaction
of individuals with standard economic preferences. This should not be seen as argument
against altruistic or intrinsic motives for norm compliance. By intrinsic norm compliance
32In (21)t h ee ﬀectiveness of enforcement depends on per-capita resources e and is invariant with respect
to n.
28I mean that individuals have an internalized punishment and reward mechanism which
induces them to contribute to a public good even though they don￿t have to fear any
sanctioning by others or by a public enforcement institution. In the presented model,
this means that the eﬀective sanctioning factor in penalty-reward scheme (2) contains
an intrinsic component β0, in addition to component βf resulting from the enforcement
system, i.e. the eﬀective sanctioning strength is e β = β0+βf.For β =1and f =1 − 1
1+En−γ,
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is used to cover both the case of non-rivalry speci￿ed by (14) and the
case of rivalry speci￿ed by (18 ) ,w eg e tt h ee ﬀective penalty-reward factor
e β = β0 +1−
1
1+En−γ (24)











(1 − β0) (25)
instead of ρ = α
1−α under speci￿cation (14) and (18) considered in Section 4 and 5. Using




1+( 1− β0) αn
1−α
. (26)
This shows very clearly how intrinsic norm compliance supports public good provision
(g0 rises with β0). In fact, in small groups it may be the only source of controlling free-
rider incentives since, according to our analysis, for low values of n possibly no means of
enforcement are provided in the noncooperative equilibrium at Stage 1.H o w e v e r ,e q u a t i o n
(26) also shows that public good provision based on intrinsic norm compliance alone breaks
down when n gets large. This leaves us with the question how other psychological factors
may interact with public norm enforcement in large societies.
Section 5 has shown that, when enforcement resources are subject to rivalry, a nec-
essary prerequisite for the emergence of public norm enforcement is the possibility to
29produce a maximal degree of enforcement at a feasible level of per-capita contribution
to enforcement e<y .A natural channel for the interaction of psychological factors and
public norm enforcement is the following: Favorable psychological characteristics make
eﬀective enforcement easier. For instance, if individuals are more truthful, behavior can
be more accurately veri￿ed with a given resource level e, i.e. ceteris paribus, the degree of
enforcement rises. In our framework this corresponds to a rise of A in (21). An immediate
consequence is that the maximal degree of enforcement is already reached with a lower
level of resources e spent on enforcement. Thus, the restriction y>e on the per-capita
income required for the noncooperative support of eﬀective public norm enforcement is
more easily met. A further consequence of this kind of psychological augmentation of
public enforcement is: The welfare level V ∗ = αα (1 − α)
1−α (y − e) achieved in the non-
cooperative equilibrium increases.
Another psychological interaction could be that people react more or less sensitive
to variations in enforcement activities. For instance, fE is high if they quickly reveal
their behavior when watched by two rather than one investigator. This means that B
is aﬀected in (21). Such an interaction between psychological characteristics and public
norm enforcement has the following less obvious consequence. According to the proof of













B (y − e)
. (27)
Thus, for any given values of y,n,α and e, if sensitivity B increases, the inequality
guaranteeing an equilibrium with e∗ (n)=e is more easily satis￿ed and noncooperative
support of public norm enforcement becomes more likely.33
33Note that the inequality is also satis￿ed more likely if y is high or if the public good g has higher
weight α in the individuals￿ preferences.
307C o n c l u s i o n
In small groups mutual sanctioning and rewarding supports norm compliance of individual
members in a decentralized way. If groups get large ￿ in big associations or at the level of
a whole society ￿ specialized enforcement institutions take over the function of imposing
norms by punishment and reward. This requires economic resources which the members
of the society have to pay. The question that was addressed in this paper is: Why are they
willing to pay? If norm enforcement was a private good, this would be a trivial question.
However, enforcing a norm involves a twofold public good problem. First, complying with
a norm means that individuals contribute a certain amount to a public good. This is why
norm compliance is desirable in the ￿rst place. Second, enforcing norm compliance is also
a public good since nobody can be excluded from the bene￿ts of eﬀective enforcement.
Thus, in addition to the incentive to free-ride on others by contributing less than the
norm to some public good there is a second-level free-rider motive to let other pay for the
funds required for ￿nancing an enforcement institution.
The contribution of this paper is to show how public norm enforcement can emerge
as decentralized equilibrium in large societies of individuals with standard economic pref-
erences. This is achieved by a new approach to the private provision of the second-order
public good norm enforcement. Rather than starting from a model in which an economy
is a tabula rasa on which individuals with given preferences and endowments interact,
this paper takes the standard view of general equilibrium analysis that in any given situ-
ation a real economy consists of three fundamentals, including technology in addition to
endowments and preferences. The basic assumption of the paper is that private agents
can operate monitoring technologies (information acquisition about individual behavior,
instruments of punishment and reward), provided they can raise a suﬃc i e n ta m o u n to f
resources, just as managers or entrepreneurial agents run production technologies of ￿rms
in a private market equilibrium. The essential diﬀerence is that the produced good ￿norm
enforcement￿ is a public good so that the noncooperative provision of the funds that can
be invested in the enforcement technology is subject to the free-riding problem. It was
31shown that nonetheless noncooperative provision of public enforcement funds is sustained
even if group size increases to in￿nity. Whether or not the provided enforcement funds
suﬃce to induce substantial contributions to the intrinsic public good at the second stage
depends on the eﬀectiveness of the available technology. However, it was shown that even
in economies as large as the largest countries in the world an almost eﬃcient level of
public good provision may result in the considered noncooperative two stage equilibrium.
Intuitively, the results may be best understood by focussing on the external eﬀects
involved in the double public good problem. At each stage ￿ the provision of public en-
forcement resources and the provision of the intrinsicly valued public good, respectively ￿
individual contributions have positive externalities on other individuals. If the two stages
are considered in isolation, these externalities lead to underprovision of the respective
public good. However, contributions to the public enforcement resource exert a negative
externality on others in the following ￿rst-order contribution game. The free-riding possi-
bilities in this game are reduced if more is contributed to the public enforcement funds. In
sum, the externalities working in opposite directions do not accentuate the market failure
in public good provision but help to cure it.
The fact that an institution, enforcing public good provision, is economically supported
in a decentralized equilibrium of arbitrarily large populations provides an individualistic
explanation for why large associations with eﬀective norms and collective goods emerge
or are sustained. No exogenous power was assumed nor any bargaining or social contract.
The two prerequisites are: Availability of an enforcement technology and feasibility of eco-
nomic penalties and rewards as instruments for sanctioning. An enforcement institution
emerges or is sustained in a population of autonomous agents if their individual decisions
to invest in that opportunity generates enough resources to realize it eﬀectively. The focus
of this paper was to prove that even individuals with standard economic preferences may
voluntarily provide the economic means for an eﬀective public sanctioning system with
the purpose to guarantee the provision of a public good. Psychological factors like intrin-
sic norm compliance, sincerity, or sensitivity to punishment and reward can augment the
32purely economic interests. In the presented framework, such psychological factors work
like a productivity progress in the feasible enforcement technology.
The presented model is silent on the endogenous evolution of enforcement technologies
over time. However, it is consistent with the following view on the development of norms
and institutions ￿ be it past or future history. In a given historical situation, there is
a feasible set of production possibilities to which private agents have access. The scale
at which a technology can be run by an individual or private agency without exogenous
coercive power depends on how much funds can be raised by voluntary contributions.
This in turn depends ￿ apart from people￿s preferences and endowments ￿ on the eﬀec-
tiveness of the technologies. Obviously, the eﬀectiveness of production possibilities is a
function of many dimensions of the state of development ￿ the available technical tools,
the organizational and psychological Know-how, but also already existing institutions can
be exploited. Thus, if we ask, for instance, if in the future a private agency will be able
to enforce certain behavioral norms at a world wide scale ￿ inducing compliance with en-
vironmental, ethic or security standards at a non-negligible degree ￿ we have to account
for the fact that such an agency, like ￿rms in conventional production, have access to the
state of arts, including the Know-how how to use existing private or public institutions.
In the same way, we have to be aware that in any moment of past history private agents
could use the state of art at their time. This paper has shown that in this way public norm
enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium even in a very large population. I
do not claim that this is the only channel. For instance, when such a private agency has
got substantial norm enforcing power by noncooperative support, cooperative forces may
step in and require to control this power by contracts, voting procedures or integration
into politically controlled public institutions. In any case, they become part of the set of
Know-how and instruments de￿ning the production possibilities that can be used for the
production of norm enforcement from then on. In this sense, I think the shown possibility
of noncooperative emergence of norm enforcement is a key element in the development of
institutions, in particular of institutions covering large populations.
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37Appendix A
Let preferences of individuals i =1 ,...,nbe given by utility functions Ui (c,G), where
both c and G are assumed to be normal goods. For a given n, let e β (E) ≡ βf (E,n).
At Stage 2, individual i chooses gi so that
MRS







with equality holding if gi > 0.
Substituting(6) for G in condition (4), we get for all i with positive contributions the
equation
MRS
i (ci,Y − E − C)=1− e β (E) (A.2)



















Under the assumption that all individuals contribute a positive amount gi so that (A.2)
holds for 1,...,n, aggregation gives us
Pn
i=1 ci (Y,C,E)=C. This equation implicitly
de￿nes






















Substituting Z (Y,E) for C in ci (Y,C,E), we get
ci = z
i (Y,E) (A.4)
with zi (Y,E) ≡ ci (Y,Z(Y,E),E).






< 0 and MRSi
c > 0.
38Combining (3), (4), (6) with (A.3), (A.4) and solving for gi we get
gi =
(n − 1)[yi − ei − zi (Y,E)] − e β (E)[Y − E − Z (Y,E)]
n
‡




(Use g−i = G
n−1 −
gi
n−1.) This characterizes the Stage 2 equilibrium strategies as functions
of the Stage 1 outcome ei,E.





where ci = zi (Y,ei + E−i) and G = Y − (ei + E−i) − Z (Y,ei + E−i) is anticipated from
the Stage 2 equilibrium.








for an individual contributing a positive amount ei to the public enforcement funds.
Combining (A.7) with (A.1), we obtain as a necessary condition for an equilibrium in
which all individuals contribute:
h










The condition de￿nes the size of enforcement funds E as a function of Y.
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At F =0 , the ￿rst square-bracketed term equals
αρE
ρ − 1
Y −E and the second square-
bracketed term equals 1
Y −E
1
ρE. Thus, at F =0 , ∂F
























Y −E + 1
Y −E
ρEE














so that the second-order condition is equivalent to the inequality












Using ρ = α
1−α (1 − βf),ρE = − α
1−αβfE and ρEE = − α
1−αβfEE, we get









fE which is equivalent to
















(1 − βf) < 0. (B.4)
Case: f = A − B
1+En−γ.
In this case, fE = Bn−γ
(1+En−γ)2 and fEE = −
Bn−γ 2(1+En−γ)n−γ
(1+En−γ)4 so that inequality (B.4)
reduces to 2αβ Bn−γ
(1+En−γ)
2 < 2n−γ
1+En−γ (1 − βf) which is equivalent to αβB<(1 + En−γ)
(1 − βf)=( 1+En−γ)(1− βA)+βB. Rearranging terms, we have
βB (α − 1) < 1+En
−γ. (B.5)
which holds since α < 1.
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Let f =1− B
1+En−γ, 0 <B≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and β =1 . Then, ρ = α




























(y − e) − α2B (y − e)=nγ ¡
1
n + en−γ¢2
(1 − α)+nγ ¡
1
n + en−γ¢
αB and further transformed to (1 − α)αB (y − e) − α(1 − α)




(1 − α)+( nγ−1 + e)αB.
Multiplying both sides of the equation by nγ, we get (1 − α)αBynγ−α(1 − α)nγ−1y−
(1 − α)αBnγe + α(1 − α)nγ−1e − α(1 − α)ye+ α(1 − α)e2 = n2γ−2 (1 − α)
+2nγ−1 (1 − α)e + e2 (1 − α)+n2γ−1αB + αBnγe.
After division by 1−α and collection of terms this equation reduces to D(γ)−k (e)e =













+ αy +( 2− α)n
γ−1. (C.2)
With B =1these terms reduce for γ =0to D,k and for γ =1to e D,e k in the main text.
QED.
Appendix D
Suppose that e∗ (n) < e. Then, according to (13), F =0at e∗ (n) or e∗ (n)=0 .
In any case, F<0 at e, since according to Appendix B, F 0 < 0 whenever F =0 .
Hence, if F ≥ 0 at e, then e∗ (n)=e. Now, at e we have ρ = α




ρE = − α
1−αβ
B/n
(1+e)2 = − α












1−α (n − κ) B
(1+e)2 − 1
















Bn2(y−e). For κ > 1−α the
left side increases with n, whereas the right side decreases. Thus there exists a threshold
n above which the inequality holds. QED.
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